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Comparing COVID-19 Policies: An Analysis of COVID-19 Response in Qatar 




 The novel coronavirus, COVID-19, first appeared in early 2020 and has since 
been able to spread rapidly across the globe. The rapid government response to the 
growing public health crisis created a unique opportunity to analyze and compare the 
COVID-19 related public health policies as enacted by various nations.  
 Having dealt with the impact of MERS and SARS prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, the Middle East provides a distinct perspective into the question of whether 
prior exposure to public health crises prepared governments in the region to respond to 
COVID-19. Utilizing news sources reporting on public health policies in the region, as 
well as public health data as reported by the World Health Organization and the 
Coronavirus resource center: COVID-19 dashboard by the Center for Systems Science 
and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University, I compare policies and subsequent health 
outcomes in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.  
 Were prior public health crises advantageous to countries within the Middle East 
in terms of their ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic? Based on regional 
evidence of national and subnational public health policy responses taking place during 
the period of COVID-19 pandemic onset, which can be defined as winter to spring of 
2020, in addition to regional morbidity and mortality rate, this paper concludes that the 
data suggests otherwise. The COVID-19 pandemic emphasized the importance of 
political actors having the capacity to offer effective public health policy responses, thus 
this paper offers a theoretical framework for why Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, 
despite their unique advantages, were equally unable to significantly lessen the number of 
confirmed cases and reported deaths due to COVID-19. 
 
 Keywords: COVID-19, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, public health policies, immigrant 
workers 
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Comparing COVID-19 Policies: An Analysis of COVID-19 Response in Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates 
 
Jaclyn Jew, Binghamton University 
1.0 Background 
 As of December 15th, 2020, there have been more than 73 million reported cases, and 
more than 1.5 million reported deaths1 as a result of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19. Since its 
first appearance in early 2020, COVID-19 has been able to spread rapidly across the globe 
through human-to-human viral transmission2. The severity of the disease in combination with its 
rapid virality required governments across the globe to react swiftly in enacting public health 
policies that would reduce the spread of the virus. The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique 
opportunity to analyze and compare public health policies across nations with similar 
characteristics. This essay compares the policies enacted by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
in response to the pandemic. In both countries, policies were primarily enacted at the national 
level. The comparison of these two countries allows for some insight into public health policy 
and the preparedness of public health systems in the Middle East.  
 Qatar reported its first case of COVID-19 on February 29th, 20203. As of July 2020, 
Qatar, with a case per capita rate of 3.929 per 100,000 people4, was found to have the highest 
rate of COVID-19 cases per capita in the entire world. Currently, the total amount of confirmed 
cases in Qatar stands at 141,121 with a total of 241 deaths1. What makes the country particularly 
unique is its population demographics. Out of Qatar’s 2.8 million residents, 88 percent of the 
population is comprised of expatriate workers who are primarily males between the ages of 20 
and 50 years old2,4. Medical research has shown that males and those within older age groups are 
disproportionately susceptible to COVID-192. From February to April non-Qatari patients tested 
positive for COVID-19 at significantly higher numbers than Qatari patients (see Figure 1). High 
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proportions of non-native groups such as these expatriate workers can affect the transmission of 
viruses due to high levels of population influx and efflux, thus potentially worsening the 
epidemiological situation. It is a factor that requires addressing by the government of Qatar and 
by its fellow countries in the Middle East also with large expatriate populations. 
 The United Arab Emirates reported its first case of COVID-19 on January 29th, 2020, and 
was the first Middle Eastern country to do so5. The country reported its first two COVID-19 
related deaths on March 20th, 2020. There are currently 186,041 reported confirmed cases and 
618 reported deaths in the country1. That number has grown dramatically since the start of the 
summer: from 25,063 confirmed cases and 227 deaths reported as of May 20th, 20206. Two 
observations stand out regarding the country’s approach towards the pandemic. Scholars have 
commented on the lack of concern and awareness5 amongst the United Arab Emirates’ citizenry. 
Another interesting aspect is the role played by the competing and sometimes overlapping 
authorities between two major cities, Abu Dhabi and Dubai7, which may be the reason behind 
the subnational policies enacted in the United Arab Emirates, which is in stark contrast to the 
lack of subnational policies in Qatar.  
2.0 Policies during the Period of Pandemic Onset 
 Defining the period of pandemic onset in the Middle Eastern region as the time from the 
initial case in the United Arab Emirates till the end of April, there is a clear trend of policy 
severity growing in response to the growing numbers of confirmed positive COVID-19 cases. 
 Qatar initially started by mandating that those arriving from Iran and South Korea were 
required to quarantine upon arrival8. However, following their initial first reported case at the 
end of February, restrictive policies started to become enacted more frequently. At the beginning 
of March travel suspensions from Egypt9 and Italy10 were enacted. A more extreme travel 
suspension, stopping all travel from Bangladesh, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, 
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Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Thailand was then announced on 
March 8th, 202011. On the other hand, exit travel was not heavily restricted aside from where 
other countries banned entrance to visitors2. The following day, Qatar announced that it would 
shut down its schools and universities on the 10th of March until further notice12. About a week 
later all shops, bank branches, and shopping centers were closed under new government 
regulations, and the closure of restaurants, cafes, and food trucks at common social sports clubs 
and parks soon followed13, 14. Also in early March, the government implemented standard 
protocols as outlined by the World Health Organization in terms of testing, contact tracing, social 
distancing guidelines, and eventually the shut-down of all non-essential businesses and business 
activity4. Around the same time, the government also locked down the capital city of Doha by 
deploying the cordon sanitaire around the Industrial Area4. The Industrial Area is home to the 
worker barracks for many of the expatriate migrant workers who find themselves working in the 
many factories and warehouses in the area. To mark the cordon the government established 
roadblocks and concrete barriers around most of the area’s perimeter. On April 1st, Qatar ordered 
its private sector companies to have 80 percent of their workforce working from home15. Policies 
issued in May mainly saw the continuations of previously announced policies as the number of 
positive cases continued to grow as depicted in Figure 2. The only additional restrictive policy 
was a controversial mandatory contact tracing app which went into effect on May 22nd, 202016. 
 Following the confirmation of its first cases in January, the United Arab Emirates began 
implementing preventative measures in line with the rules and regulations put forth by the World 
Health Organization17. The United Arab Emirates’ government began screening all passengers 
arriving from China on January 23rd, 2020. This included all incoming passengers coming in 
through Dubai International airport and Abu Dhabi International airport5. About a month later 
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the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation imposed a 
travel ban on all travel from Iran and Thailand5, which coincided with Qatar’s first confirmed 
cases among the travelers returning from Iran. Like in Qatar, as the number of confirmed cases 
and reported deaths began to increase (see Figure 3), the severity of public health policies grew. 
In the beginning of March, the government announced the closure of all schools and universities 
until further notice which was then followed by the temporary closure of all places of worship5. 
Towards the end of the month, the United Arab Emirates placed restrictions on flights, 
suspending all passenger flights but allowing cargo flights carrying essential goods. Malls were 
shut down and the government acknowledged that many citizens would be remaining in isolation 
for long periods of time. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority unblocked Skype and 
Google Hangouts so that citizens could use these services5. On the 25th of March, the 
government announced the National Disinfection Program with a purpose of completely 
sterilizing all public utilities, metro services, and public transportation during the weekends. 
Nonetheless, the Dubai Metro and the Dubai Tram were suspended at the end of March. Curfews 
were also put in place, in addition to a fine of AED 50,000 for anyone caught violating any 
COVID-19 related measures5. Further restrictive measures in April included the suspension of 
inter-city buses in Sharjah. The government also launched a mobile app to ensure that people 
directed to self-quarantine were complying with mandatory quarantine requirements5. May saw 
the United Arab Emirates moving towards a hopeful “recovery” phase as the government began 
to lift restrictions6. Understanding possible factors that influenced the rise in restrictive policies, 
as well as the rollback of these same policies, is vital to understanding what gaps may exist in 
each country’s level of preparedness and effectiveness in dealing with viral diseases of COVID-
19’s caliber.      




The region has a history with other strains of coronavirus, having been plagued by 
episodes of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) beginning in 20127, 18. 
These experiences combined with having dealt with other outbreaks such as the Ebola virus 
contribute to the theory that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates would be better prepared for the 
COVID-19 pandemic than countries outside of the Middle East. This theory is also supported by 
the idea that improvements to public health systems in both countries would have taken place 
and have been tailored to address public health emergencies in light of these prior outbreaks. In 
fact, the World Health Organization’s 2015 health profiles for both countries support this 
reasoning. Following the emergence of MERS, a major gap in Qatar’s lack of a national 
infection control program was revealed, requiring the country to begin prioritizing enhancing 
surveillance measures for severe acute respiratory infections (SARS), developing new and 
improved policies and plans based on scientific evidence, and building up their public health 
workforce18. This led to the development of a national infection prevention and control program 
which is now active through the country’s Ministry of Public Health. As for the United Arab 
Emirates, MERS shined a light on some of the gaps in the country’s public health systems by 
testing their capacity for routine surveillance and their ability to detect the emergence of health 
threats. The country then refocused its efforts on establishing a program for monitoring and 
mitigating such threats, creating national policies targeting emergency preparedness and 
response, and redirecting focus to community vulnerabilities7. These efforts should have given 
some sense of preparedness to these countries, but the number of confirmed cases and reported 
deaths due to COVID-19 suggests otherwise.        
Failure to account for the specifics of population susceptibility may present an 
explanation for the elevated numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases and associated deaths. As 
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previously mentioned, men have been reported to be more susceptible to COVID-19. Population 
graphs from 2010 demonstrate that the populations of both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
are primarily male (see Figure 4)7, 18. This would suggest that a greater percentage of the 
population in both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were susceptible to the virus and thus 
contributed to the higher numbers seen in these countries. Qatar also has the added factor of 
immigrant workers forming the predominant part of its population. Since these workers are 
disproportionally likely to travel outside the country as they leave or return for work, this 
increased amount of travel can serve as a big transmittance vector thus contributing to the 
country’s overall confirmed case number. Figure 1 reports that confirmed cases in Qatar were 
more prevalent among non-Qatari patients than for Qatari patients.  
In both countries, it appears that policies followed observed health threat, with the most 
policies enacted in March (see Figures 2 and 3). There may also be an economic factor that 
caused delayed implementation of certain restrictions such as travel bans and restrictions on 
commercial businesses, however, this requires further study.   
4.0 Conclusion 
 As a new phase of this pandemic approaches due to the promise of a viable vaccine, the 
capacity of the political actors to offer effective public health policy response becomes of even 
greater importance. This makes the understanding of how governments acted at the pandemic’s 
onset a priority. Their action or inaction can be predictive for the creation and implementation of 
new policies going forward. 
 Understanding population demographics, including which groups within the country are 
most vulnerable or susceptible to the disease, is vital for creating policy that can best serve the 
country’s population as a whole. Also, as restrictive policies are rolled back with vaccine 
availability, it is important to understand what warning signs need to be tracked. This was a 
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necessity in the implementation of initial restrictive policies but is also necessary in the end-of-
pandemic management.6. While the value of the numerical epidemiological thresholds as signals 
for policy measures is mostly understood, the political will and the political capacity to make 
those policies remain a variable in need of studying. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and that could serve as a platform to reaffirm 
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Figure 2: Confirmed cases in Qatar from February 1st to December 15th. Source: World Health 
Organization 
 




Figure 3: Confirmed cases and reported deaths in the United Arab Emirates from February 1st to 
December 15th. Source: World Health Organization 
 
 
Figure 4: (A) Population distribution of men 
versus women in Qatar in 2010. (B) Population distribution of men versus women in the United 
Arab Emirates in 2010. Source: World Health Organization7, 18 
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